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UNINTENDED PARTNERSHIP

By JUDsON A. CRANE*
Infinite variety is possible in the agreements by which persons
unite property or services in the hope of gain. As legal problems
arise between associates, or between one or all of them and outsiders, the method of solution is to classify the associates as constituting some standard relation, such as partnership, co-owners, or
principal and agent, and then to apply the rules of law appropriate
to the relation found to exist. As there is a prima facie presumption that persons sharing profits are partners it is often necessary
to decide whether or no that relation exists, and in so deciding the
solution of the problem is generally apparent. This method is used
in such problems as whether one is liable for the contract' or
tortS2 of another; whether a creditor may levy on property held
in co-ownership by the debtor and another 3 whether property
held in co-ownership is taxable to the group or to the members
severally4 ; whether the interest of an associate in real property
held by the group is personal or real property'; whether income
is taxable to the group or to members severally 6 ; whether co* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. School of Law.
Jones v. Gould, 209 N. Y., 419, 103 N. D. 720 (1913).
In re Marcuse & Co., 281
Fed 928 (1922) ; aff'd sub som. Giles v. Vette, 263 U. S. 553, 68 L. Ed. 181 (1924);
Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860).
2 Kopka v. Yockey, 131 N. B. 828 (Ind. App. 1921) ; Champion v. Bostwick, 18
wend, 175 (1837) ; Thomas v. Springer, 123 App. Div. 640. 119 N. Y. S. 460 (1909).
3 Butler Savings Bank v. Osborne, 159 Pa. St. 10, 28 Atl. 163 (1893).
' Williams V. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. B. 355 (1915).
Dana v. Treas., 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 355 (1915).
Westby v. Bekkedal, 172 Wis. 114, 178 N. W. 451 (1920).
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debtors are subject to bankruptcy proceedings as a group';
and what are the obligations between associates and the remedies
for breach of such obligations8 .
Where the entire terms of association are embodied in a writing
the nature of the relation thereby created is a judicial question s .
If the writing is uncertain in its meaning, or if the agreement
is not in writing there is a jury question as to the facts of the
agreement, but a judicial question of the legal effects of the
agreement. 10
The relation of partnership is not like a corporation or a limited
partnership, a relation existing de jure only after compliance with
certain formalities of organization prescribed by legislation, but a
common law consentual relation requiring only a voluntary agreement between the parties. Intent is controlling, i. e. intent to enter
into a relation embodying the essential elements of what the law
classifies as partnership. If the existence of the essential elements
is doubtful the specific intent of the parties to be partners or not
is of almost decisive weight. But it sometimes happens that persons
are legally partners because they have agreed to a relation in terms
that of partnership, although they believe their relation to be
devoid of some of the obligations of partnership". The many
definitions of partnership do not in themselves furnish infallible
guides for discrimination and classification, but indicate the indicia
of the relation to be looked for and examined in each particular
2
state of facts. The definition of the Uniform Partnership Act'
7 Davis v. Stevens, 104 Fed 235 (1900) ; In re Pinson & Co., 180 Fed. 787 (1910);
In re Associated Trust, 222 Fed. 1012 (1914).
8 Runo v. Rothschild; 219 Mich. V60, 189 N. W. 183 (1922) ; Cecil v. Montgomery,
218 Pac. 311 (Okla. 1923).
9 Rider v. Hamell, 63 Kans. 733. 66 Pac. 1026 (1901) ; Florence v. Fox, 193 Ia.
1174, 188 N. W. 966 (1922) ; De Rees v. Costagula, 275 Fed. 172 (1921) ; MackieClemens Fuel Co., v. Brady, 202 Mo. App. 551, 208 S. W. 151 (1919).
10 Adamson v. Guild, 177 Mass. 331, 58 N. B. 1081 (1901); T. D. Foley Co.,
v. McKinley, 114 Minn. 271, 131 N. W. 316 (1911).
" "It
is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partnership and yet to
form one. If they agree upon an arrangement which is.a partnership in fact, it is
of no importance that they call it something else, or that they even expressly declare
that they are not to be partners. The law must declare what is the legal import of
their agreements, and names go for nothing when the substance of the arrangement
shows them to be inapplicable. But every doubtful case must be solved in favor
of their intent; ......
Cooley J. in Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785
(1881).
"Up to this time we have not alluded to the declaration in the indenture of trust
here in question that it was the intention of the parties to it to create a trust
and not a partnership. It is what the parties did in making he trust indenture that
is decisive. If there had been doubt as to what they did, what they intended to do
would have been a matter entitled to some consideration in determining what they
did." Loring J., in Williams v. Milton, 215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355 (1915).
"A decision of the question requires first, the ascertainment of their actual relation,
and then the determination of whether a partnership was thereby constituted, giving
effect to their intention If possible, but having regard for the rule that parties may
intend no partnership and yet form one." Phillips J. in Freeman v. Huttig Sash &
Door Co., 105 Texas 560, 153 S. W. 122 (1913).
See also Bradley v. Ely, 24 Ind. App. 2, 56 N. H. 44 (1900); Rosenbloom v.
Springfield Produce Brok. Co., 243 Mass. 111, 137 N. E. 357 (1922); Pooley V.
Driver, 5 Ch. Div. 458 (1876).
12 U. P. A. Sec. 6.
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is "An association of two or more persons tp carry on as co-owners
a business for profit." In applying this definition we have to
decide in each case whether the associates have associated themselves to carry on a business, and whether they intend to carry it on
as co-owners. We shall discuss separately the nature of these two
elements, as they appear in a few typical recent cases.
A.

To CARBY oN Busnqsss.

Business for profit is a series of acts of a commercial character.
For constituting a partnership the series must be of a substantial
degree of number and duration. A difficult question is how
extensive must be the business of co-owners of property put to a
profitable use in order to create partnership. This is illustrated
by cases involving the acquisition, development and operation of mining property.
In Walker v. Tupper A and B owning an oil lease assigned
a three-fourths share to C and D who agreed to develop and operate, sharing expenses and production, if any, in certain agreed
shares. A creditor, who had drilled a well under contract with
C and D sued all four parties as partners. The court held C and
D were partners, but not A and B, relying on absence of expressed
intent to form a partnership, and refusing to infer it from the
sharing of gross returns as distinguished from profits as such.
The decision seems correct, as A and B were not entitled to participate in active operation of the business carried on by C and D,
but were rather landlords receiving a share in the product in lieu
of rent for their interest in the premises. In Neal v. Shamburg"
one co-tenant of an undeveloped oil lease purchased the share of
another without disclosure of the production on an adjoining tract
owned by him, which fact affected his judgment of value. The
vendor subsequently sought to rescind the sale, claiming a breach
of the fiduciary relation of partners. 15 The court properly held
there was no partnership; there was no business carried on or
agreed to by the parties.1
In other Pennsylvania cases a joint carrying on of business is
more nearly apparent. In Dunham v. Loverock, , three co-owners
=

152 Pa. St. 1, 25 AUt. 172 (1892).
u 158 Pa. St. 263, 27 AtI. 992 (1893).
I See Joseph v. Mangos, 192 Ia. 729, 185 N. W. 464 (1921), holding there is a
of disclosure of material facts in a sale of partner's interests to his co-partner.
In jurisdictions where mining partnerships are recognized agreement to operate
is necessary to constitute the relation. Doyle v). Burns, 123 Ia. 488, 99 N. W. 195
(1904) ; Anaconda Copper Min. Co., v. Butte & B. Min. Co., 17 Mont. 541, 43 Pac.
924 (1896) ; Hartn'ey v. Gosling, 10 Wyo. 346, 68 Pac. 1118 (1902) ; Cf. Cogdall
V. Cottrell, 198 Pao. 58 (Okla. 1921), holding purchase of mining leases for resale
at a profit constituted partnership.
17 158 Pa. 197, 27 AUt. 990 (1893).
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of an oil lease shared expenses and receipts in proportion to their
interests. One co-owner sold his share to a stranger at a time
when he was owing his associates a considerable sum for expenses
of operation. The court held that there was no partnership and
therefore the debt was not a charge on the share in the leasehold
as against the assignee. The court would not, without expressed
intent, create the relation of partnership "as the consequence of a
course of conduct and dealing naturally referable to a relation
already existing between them." The result might have been the
same even if a partnership was created, as real estate used by a
partnership of co-owners does not necessarily become partnership,
property." In Buttler Savings Bank v. Osborne" two persons,
who happened each to be partnerships, acquired each a half interest
in an oil lease, which they agreed to develop and operate sharingequally, and sharing equally the proceeds of the oil which was run
into pipe lines and credited to each by the pipe line company.
Two creditors of one of the associates levied on its share in the
property, one on the theory of partnership, the other on that of
co-ownership. The latter was held entitled to the proceeds of execution sale. The existence of partnership was denied by the.
court for the same reason as in Dunham v. Loverock. As in that
case the precise question was not one of partnership, but whether
the property was partnership property.
The doctrine that the relation of co-owners is presumed to continue was again applied in Laughner v. Wally.20 A, B and C'
became co-owners of an oil lease which they developed and operated under the name of "Laughner, Wally & Co." A acted as
treasurer, all payments being made through him, and the associates
divided not the gross product as in the preceeding cases, but the
net profits. B took away an unused casing, for which in accordance
with the usage of the associates he should have paid A. An action
in assumpsit was brought against B by all the associates, including
B, "doing business as Laughner, Wally & Co." It was held that
assumpsit could be maintained and the relation was not one of
partnership. Here it was necessary to decide the issue of partnership, as assumpsit could not be brought by partners to recover
from a co-partner the price of partnership property sold to him,
and if there was a partnership the casing appears to have been
partnership property. The adoption of a name, and the doing
. Taber-Prang Art Co., v. Durhnt, 189 Mass. 173, 75 N. B. 221 (1905) ; Doylo
v. Burns, 123 Ia. 488, 99 N. W. 195 (1904).
19 159 Pa. St. 10, 28 At. 163 (1893).
0 269 Pa. St. 5, 112 At. 105 (1920) ; see also Bell V. Johnston, 281 Pa. St. 57,
126 Atl. 187 (1924).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol31/iss1/2

4

Crane: Unintended Partnerships
UNINTENDED PABTNE SHIP

of business through a treasurer, and the sharing of net profits, and
particularly the admission by plaintiffs in the form of process are
very strong evidence of an association to carry on business sufficient to overcome to presumption of mere co-ownership.
The
court said, "Considering their method of business and all the circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the defendant took
the property in question as a purchaser from the association, and
is liable as such." The result of the decision does not seem unjust
in view of the usage in the particular association of paying for
machinery taken over by a member, and not letting the debt become
an item in accounts to be charged against profits. Partners may
sever partnership property and make an isolated transaction of
its sale to a partner, distinct from partnership accounts. 2' The
case however was decided on the partnership issue and is an extreme instance of the reluctance of courts to find partnership
without expressed intent as between the parties where no publicinterest is involved. Incidentally the misjoinder of defendant as a
co-plaintiff was held to have been waived, if it were a defect, by
going to trial on the merits.
In many other jurisdictions an intermediate relation has been
devised, that of "mining partnership." While mine owners may
form an ordinary partnership, the business is such that some
of the incidents of the conventional relation would be inconvenient,
particularly those of non-transferability of interests and power
of such representation as in the usual trading partnership. These
incidents are not present in the mining partnership2 2 but there
is a remedy in equity for dissolution and account23 and the partnership property is subject to a charge for partnership obligations.
of an associate as against his assignee." The institution of mining
partnership is a commendable instance of the realization with judicial sanction of the intention of parties io form a relation sui
generis with peculiar incidents suited to their purposes and distinct
from the ordinary partnership and from co-tenancy.
There are many other instances of co-ownership for limited busin Simpson v. Richie. 110 Ale. 299, 86 AtI. 124 (1913).
7 See on transferability of shares in so-called mining partnerships Skillman V.
Lachman, 23 Cal. 198 (1863) ; Blackmar v. Williamson, 57 W. Va. 249, 50 S. E.
254 (1905) ; Duryea v. Burt, 28 Cal. 569 (1865) ; Bissell v. Foss, 114 U. S. 252, 29
L. Ed. 126 (1884).
A mining partnership is not a "trading partnership," In which partners can
borrow money and issue negotiable instruments, but there is implied authority to do
what Is necessary for the operation of the enterprise, such as purchase of materials,
Manville v. Parks, 7 Colo. 128, 2 Pac. 212 (1883) ; repair of equipment, Childers v.
Neely, 47 W. Va. 70, 34 S. E. 828 (1899); employment of labor, Lyman v.
Schwartz, 13 Colo. App. 318. 57 Pac. 735 (1899).
See also Hartley v. Gosling,
10 Wyo. 346, 68 Pac. 1118 (1902) ; Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U. S. 641, 26 L. Ed.
266 (1880).
= Childers v. Neely, supra note 22.
24 Harris v. Young, 298 Ill. 319, 131 N. E. 670 (1921).
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ness purposes, in which without expressed intent to become partners the courts have refused to find the partnership relation to
exist, such as ownership of stallions, 5 race horses,2 0 ships, 27 goods,
and real estate for investment or resale.2 8 The rule that co-ownership and division of proceeds does not in itself amount to partnership is incorporated in the Uniform Partnership Act.'
B.

To CARY ON A BusINEss As CO-OwNERS.

Not only must there be a business but a person is participating
in it as a partner only if he is a co-owner of the business. Co-ownership for this purpose means something more than co-ownership of
property or capital employed in the business. "The salient features of an ordinary partnership are (1) a community of interest
in profits and losses; (2) a community of interest in the capital
employed; and (3) a community of power in administration.""'
In addition to property ownership and profit sharing there is
necessary actual or potential participation in ultimate control.
The emphasis in the past was on profit-sharing. Today, particularly in dealing with associations many members of which are
relatively inactive, the emphasis is based on the element of control,
as a criterion of the nature of the relation of a person to a business.
At the outset, or while a business is that of a going concern,
persons may desire to invest money taking the risks of the business
as to profit and loss. Formerly, following a dictum in Grace v.
Smith,"2 first applied in Waugh v. Carver,3 it was held that who2
Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co., v. Lunt, 46 Utah 299, 151 Pac. 521 (1915);
Cf. Smith v. Braman, 51 S. W. 178 (Ky. 1899).
3 French v. Stryling, 2 C. B. N. S. 357 (1857)
Of. Morrison v. Bennett,
20 Mont. 560, 52 Pac. 553 (1898).
Croasdale v. Von Boyneburgk, 195 Pa. St. 377, 46 Atl. 6 (1900).
Hoare v. Dawes, 1 Doug. 371 (1780); Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199
(1872) ; Goell v. Morse, 126 Mass. 480 (1879 purchase of horse for resale) ; Williams
v. Knibbs, 213 Mass. 534, 100 N. E. 666 (1913 ownership of patent, apparently to be
made productive by granting of licenses) ; Rotzien v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co.,
41 So. Dak. 216, 170 N. W. 128 (1918).
M
Hudson v. French, 211 Mo. App. 175, 241 N. W. 443 (1922) ; Mageo v,.
Magee, 233 Mass. 341, 123 N. E. 673 (1919); Morrison v. Meister, 212 Bitch.
516, 180 N. W. 395 (1920); Cecil v. Montgomery, 218 Pac. 311 (Okla. 1923);
Welch v. Miller, 210 Pa. St. 204, 59 At. 1065 (1904) ; Clark v. Sidway, 142 U. S.
682, 35 L. Ed. 1157 (1892); Cf. Boreing v,. Wilson, 33 Ky L. 14, 108 S. W. 914
(1908); Canada v. Barksdale, 76 Va. 899 (1881).
In Morrison v. Meister, ubi supra, absence of indicia of partnership was pointed
out in the following language, "This was the only property they bad a common
interest in; there was no firm name, no firm funds, no firm accounts, no firm letter
heads, no firm hank account, no commingling of funds or property, no certificate of
partnership filed, no agreement as to losses, no time fixed when it would expire."
3 U. P. A. Sec. 7, (2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, Joint property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits made by the use
of the property.
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether
or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any
property from which the returns are derived.
a De Graff J. In Malvern Nat. Bank v,.Halliday, 195 Ia. 734, 192 N. W, 843
(1923).
= 2 Win. BI. 998 (1775).
2 H. BI. 235 (1793).
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ever shared the profits of a business, thereby diminished the fund
for the subsequent payment of debts and should therefore be liable
to creditors as a partner. It is now the law that excepting cases
,of estoppel, one is not a partner as to third persons unless a partner as between the associates. 34 Accordingly a lender who has no
risk of loss as between the associates beyond that of his investment,
.and no power of control beyond a right to information and inspection of accounts is not a partner.'5 An apparent exception to
this statement is found in the law of statutory Limited Partnerships.
The Limited Partnership Statutes were adopted at a time when
the profit sharing basis of partnership as to third persons was
prevalent in many states. The investor who enjoyed the fortunes
of the business was thought of as inherently a partner as regards
his liabilities. The purpose of the statutes was to provide a scheme
of participation which would relieve the investor of a natural burden of his status. He was called a "special partner," and it was
specifically provided that if all formalities of organization were
not complied with the associates were all general partners as to
their liabilities for debts.'s That he would be a special partner
and was not in reality a general partner was recognized by decisions that defective organization did not make him liable for
torts, 37 and that neglect to give notice of dissolution did not extend
his liability to contracts made after termination of the defective
partnership.38 The true nature of the association appears from
the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the

UU. P. A. Sec. 7 (1) Except as provided by Section 16 persons who are not
partners as to each other are not partners as to third persons.
1Z Rosenbloom v. Springfield Produce Co., 243 Mass. 111, 137 N. E. 357 (1922);
Cudahy Packing Co., v. Hibou, 92 Miss. 234, 46 So. 73 (1908) annotated in 18
L. R. A. N. S. 975; Harvey v. Childs, 28 Oh. St. 319 (1876) ; Boston Smelting Co.,
v. Smith, 13 R. I. 27, (1880) ; Goacher v. Bates, 280 Ill. 372, 117 N. E. 427 (1917) ;
Msieehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611 (1892) ; Mollwo March & Co., v. Court of Wards,
4 P. C. App. 419 (1872) ; see also Kilsbaw v. Jukes, 3 Best & Sm. 847 (1863) ;
Bailey Co., v. Darling, 119 Me. 326, 111 AtI. 410 (1920) ; where the principal of the
Investment was at the risk of the business.
Arrangements whereby a deceased partner's interest in a partnership is allowed
to remain as partnership capital of survivors continuing the business does not constitute the executors partners, Holcomb v. Long, 139 N. E. 633 (Mass. 1923) ; Wild
v. Davenport, 48 N. J. L. 129, 7 AtI. 295 (1886) Tisch v. Rockafellow, 209 Pa.
St. 419, 58 At. 805 (1904).
Cf. Andrews v. Stimson, 254 I1. 111, 98 N. E.
222 (1912) ; Stearns v. Brookline, 219 Mass. 238, 107 N. E. 57 (1914).
Continuance of an insolvent business by trustees for creditors in the hope
of paying off debts out of profits of operation does not constitute the creditors partners.
Wells-Stone Mercantile Co.. v. Grover, 7 No. Dak. 460, 75 N. W. 911 (1898); In
re Hoyne, 277 Fed. 668 (1922) ; Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 268 (1860).
The so-called "sub-partnership," whereby a stranger is sharing profits and losses
of one or more but less than all the partners, is not partnership; Burnett v. Snyder,
,76 N. Y. 344 (1879); Lovejoy v. Bailey, 214 Mass. 134, 101 N. E. 63 (1913);
Haine's Estate 176 Pa. St. 354, 35 At. 237 (1896).
36 Lancaster v. Choate, 5 AtI. 530 (1863) ; Myers %. Electric Co., 59 N. J. L, 153,
35 Ati. 1069 (1896) ; Sheble v. Strong, 128 Pa. St. 315. 18 At!. 397 (1889) ; Oglesby v.
Lindsay, 112 Va. 767, 72 S. E. 672 (1911) ; Strang v. Thomas, 114 Wis. 599, 91
N. W. 237 (1902).
3T McKnight v. Ratcliff, 44 Pa. St. 156 (1863).
3 Tilge v. Brooks, 124 Pa. St. 178, 16 At. 746 (1889).
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case of Giles v. Vette.39 Marcuse and Morris as general partners,.
and six others as special partners undertook to form a limited
partnership under the Illinois Act of 1874, for the conduct of
a brokerage business. The act under which they supposed they
were entitled to organize was repealed and supplanted by the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act effective in Illinois before they
fied their certificate. They could not organize a brokerage partnership under the latter Act. The question presented was whetherthe ostensible special partners were subject to bankruptcy proceedings against the insolvent firm along with the general partners.
It was held that they were not general partners or liable as such,
both under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act40 and under the
Uniform Partnership Act. The reasons were that the intended
special partners did not intend to become general partners, did
not carry on the business as co-owners or otherwise having no
authority, actual or apparent, to act for .or bind the partnership.
This decision clearly expresses and applies the modern view that
investment and profit sharing is not partnership if there is complete absence of power of conduct or control of the business.
Difficult and doubtful questions with conflicting solutions by the
courts are presented in cases where the associates do not intend
what they understand as partnership but some other form of a~sociation such as corporation or trust. In corporation law there is
the generally accepted institution of de facto corporation, immunity from personal liability resulting from bona fide color of compliance with a law of organization and action in the corporate
form. 4 If the requisites above stated are lacking the de facto
doctrine is inapplicable. Are the associates who so engage in group
action partners? There are present the essentials of partnership,
a business entered into for profit by a group of persons who actively
participate as officers or directors or possess and exercise a power
of control as stockholders. Many decisions holding the associates
liable on contracts speak of them as being liable "as partners,"
and might be regarded as going no farther than treating the active
participants in unauthorized corporate action as co-principals with
liabilities similar to those of partners. One case at least holds:
so U. S. Supreme Court Adv. Ops. 1923-1924, 181, 68 L. Ed. (1924) aff'g In re
Marcuse & Co., 281 Fed. 928 (1922).
See 36 HAnv. L. Rav. 1016.
40 U. L. P. A. Sec. 11, providing that one erroneously believing himself a limited
partner is not liable as a general partner is on discovering his mistake he promptly
renounces his Interest in profits or other compensation by way of Income.
The
supposed limited partners in Giles v. vette had complied with this section.
41 See E. H. Warren, "Collateral Attack on Incorporatiob," 20 HAav. L. Rnv.
456; Inter-Ocean Co., v. Robertson, 296 Ill. 92, 129 N. E. 523 (1921).
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them partners, in that they can be adjudicated bankrupt under the
42
partnership section of the Bankruptcy Act.
Supposing a de jure corporation to be formed in one state what
is the status of its members with respect to acts in a foreign state
committed without compliance with requirements for the licensing
-of foreign corporations? After a period of doubt as to whether the
corporate franchise could be recognized outside the state which
conferred it, 43 it was agreed that on principles of comity the corporate existence created in the state of organization, with its ac.companying rights and immunities should be recognized in a
foreign state, unless inconsistent with its policy as to corporate
action laid down by legislative enactment. "It was not necessary
that the corporation should have an existence in this state as a
-corporation, but with the consent of this state it could do business
here on the principles of comity. With the exception of corporalions in the service of the United States or engaged in interstate or
-foreign commerce, the permission of a state to exercise corporate
functions therein is necessary, and any state may exclude a foreign
-corporation entirely or fix the conditions under which it may do
business in the state."" The states have forbidden foreign corporations to engage in doing business unless certain formalities are
complied with, and affixed penalties for noncompliance. In some
-states officers, agents and stockholders are by statutory provision
expressly made jointly and severally liable personally on contracts
purporting to be made by unauthorized foreign corporations."
In some states members have been held to be partners. An important recent case to this effect at common law is Equitable Trust Co.
v. Central Trust Co." The Dayton Coal & Iron Company, Ltd., was
,organized in 1883 under the laws of Great Britain as a corporation, to operate mining properties in Tennessee. It was reorganized
in 1895 and again in 1897, and neither of the latter two corporations complied with the laws in Tennessee as to foreign corporations. The Commercial Bank of Scotland and the Bank of Scotland
became shareholders. The company became bankrupt and a bill
in equity was filed by certain general creditors alleging that the
42 Davis v. Stevens, 104 Fed. 235 (1900).
See also Morse v. Burkhart Mfg. Co.,
154 Ark. 362, 242 S. W. 810 (1922) ; Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417, 44 N. E.
99 (1896) ; Francis M. Burdick, "Are Defectively Incorporated Associations Partnerships?" 6 COL. L. REv. 1; Jos. L. Lewinsohn, "Liability to Third Persons of
Associates in Defectively Incorporated Associations," 13 Mice. L. REV. 271. "Are
Members of a Defectively Organized Corporation Liable as Partners?" 3 On. L. REV.
-206.
43 See

HENDERSON,

FOREIGN

CORPORATIONS

IN AunrcAx

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW.

"4 Cartwright J. in Joseph Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N. E. 650
(1917).
45 Chesley v. Soo Lignite Coal Co., 19 No. Dak. 18, 121 N. W. 73 (1909);
Lyner Engineering Works 'v. Kempner, 163 Fed. 605 (1908).
'1 145 Tenn. 148, 239 S. W. 171 (1922).
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company was a partnership, of which the Scottish banks were partners, the purpose being to reach funds payable to the banks as the
proceeds of foreclosing a mortgage on company property, of which
the banks and others were mortgagees. It was held that the Commercial Bank was a stockholder that had actively exercised its
rights as such, participating in direction of the company and was
a partner, "since the corporation was without power to contract,
and as the stockholders could not bind it, they necessarily bound
themselves." The liability was so created only as to acts of the
associates in Tennessee, and not as to acts beyond its jurisdiction,
as in Ohio and New York. As the Bank of Scotland held stock
only as collateral and did not participate in management by voting
it was not held a partner. Allegations that neither bank had
authoiity under charter or corporations laws of Great Britain to
enter into partnership were not noticed by the court.47 It was held
to be immaterial that the banks and the petitioning creditors of
the Dayton Company were ignorant of the non-compliance with the
Tennessee laws and supposed that there was do jure corporate
action. While this is a disregard of specific intent, and is a hardship on bona fide non-resident and relatively inactive stockholders,
it is a logical result of the power of a state to designate the legal
status of a group engaging in group action within its jurisdiction.
A corporation is essentially an association to carry on business for
profit with community of interest and control. It differs from a
partnership as a legal institution in that the state has conferred
certain privileges on the group, including legal personality as a
unit, with consequent immunity from personal liability of the individual associates. The state creating the corporation by undertaking to vest privileges in the group cannot ensure their recognition
by the courts of another state as regards group action in that state.
The foreign state may prohibit corporate action unless certain conditions are fulfilled. If the group violates the prohibition the
foreign state may regard the acts done as corporate action, though
disobedient, or it may regard them simply as the action of a group
of persons who do not deserve and cannot be held to possess any
corporate privileges whatever. Which view is taken depends on the
relative weight of considerations of comity favoring recognition of
,1 A corporation is acting ultra vires in becoming a partner, Whittenton Mills v.
Upton, 10 Gray 582 (1858) ; Hosher-Platt Co. v. Miller, 238 Mass. 518, 131 N. 19.
310 (1921); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Wehrman, 202 U. S. 295, 50 I. Ed. 103
(1906).

In one case the facts were found to constitute partnership but for the fact that
one party to the agreement was a corporation. A partnership being ultra vires
the relation was held to be that of joint adventure, with the same consequence, a
right to an accounting, as if a partnership had been formed. Luhrig Collieries Co., v.
Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265 (1922).
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foreign institutions, and considerations supporting the legislative
policy against unauthorized corporate .action. There is some authority in support of the inhospitable view taken in Equitable
Trust Co. v. Central Trust Company,' but the weight of authority
49
is to the contrary.
The trust form of business organization has been frequently employed by large associations for the purpose of gaining transferability of shares and permanency and concentration of management without submission to the restrictions and burdens imposed by
legislative regulations of corporations. The trust is clearly an association to carry on business the beneficiaries or shareholders being
the equitable owners of the property and sharing the profits, if any,
and subjecting their investment to the risks of the business. Legislatures have to some extent classified it as an association sui generis,
or at least distinct from the partnership and the conventional
trust created by others than the beneficiaries, such as a testamentary trust s0 The courts have been reluctant to extend recognition
to a new form of association and have tried to squeeze it into the
partnership category along with joint stock companies whenever
it can be found that the terms of organization vest in the associates
the control feature of co-ownership. Nina v. Cravens & Cage Co."
illustrates the length to which courts have gone in finding the
existence of sufficient measure of control. The association there
involved was formed to engage in the automobile business. The
trustees were to "have and exercise exclusive management, disposition and control of same (the property), subject to the terms and
provisions of the declaration of trust." It was provided that
trustees could not bind cestuis, and further, "To eliminate any
question which might be raised as to the intention of the parties
23 Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (1905); Taylor v. Branham, 35 Fla.
297, 17 So. 352 (1895); Cunningham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. . 1147
(1916) ; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S. W. 633 (1918) ; see 26 YALE L. Jour.
481; L. R. A. 1917 B 574.
Officers and agents actively engaging in transactions in behalf of unlicensed foreign
corporations have been held liable as partners, Joseph T. Ryerson & Son 'V.
Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N. E. 650 (1917) ; see also Lasher v. Stimson, 145 Pa. St.
30, 23 Atl. 552 (1892) ; Raff v. Isman, 235 Pa. St. 347, 84 Atil. 352 (1912) ; 27
YAL L. JouR. 248.
"0 NatI. Bank of Wichita v. Spot Cash Coal Co., 98 Ark. 597, 136 S. W. 953(1911) ; Beal v. Childress, 92 Kans. 109, 139 Pac. 1198 (1914) ; Shawmut Commercial Paper Co., v. Auerbach, 214 Mass. 363, 101 N. E. 1000 (1913); Pierce V.
Yeaton, 78 N. H. 378, 100 Atl. 604 (1917); Merrick v. Van Santwood, 34 N. Y.
308 (1860); Stephenson v. Dodson, 36 Pa. Super. 343 (1908).
'0 Chicago Title & Trust Co., v. Smietamke, 275 Fed. 60 (1921) holds an association in the trust form where associates had limited powers of control over the trustees
to be a "corporation," "Joint-stock company or association' and not a partnership ortrust within the meaning of the Federal Revenue Act of 1913. So also a similar
association was held to he an "association" and not a trust under the Act of 1916 in
Malley v. Howard, 281 Fed. 363 (1922), certiorarigranted 260 U. S. 715.
A business trust has been adjudicated bankrupt as an association, In re Associated Trust, 222 Fed. 1012 (1914).
Trusts are expressly included in the "Blue Sky Law" of Pennsylvania, 192k
P. L. 779.
51 253 S. W. 582, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922-1923).
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to this instrument, as well as to the cestuis que trustents it is hereby
stipulated and declared that the purpose is to create a trust and not
a partnership." No powers were expressed as vested in cestuis,
but the court inferred from the absence of provisions for election
of trustees, save in case of unexpired terms, and presence of provisions for meetings of cestuis, that cestuis had the power to elect
trustees and at their annual and special meetings to supervise the
business. Therefore the trustees were "subject to the control of the
certificate holders," and the latter were properly held liable as
partners. The court cited a line of Massachusetts cases, apparently
as sustaining the proposition that if the terms of association provide for meetings of beneficiaries for the purpose of taking any
action whatever the association is a partnership. It also cited
Wells v. Mackey Telegraph & Cable Co., '2 in the opinion of which
case it is stated that the trust form of organization "cannot be substituted for statutory methods of limiting the liability of persons
associating themselves together for the purpose of conducting a
business for profit."
This sentence expresses the crucial point.
Are beneficiaries conducting a business by reason of power to
periodically elect trustees who do directly conduct it, or to fill
vacancies in unexpired terms, or alter, amend or terminate the
terms of association? Unless it can be fairly said that they are
conducting a business the holding them, contrary to their expressed
intent, to the liabilities of partners is a reversion to the discarded
rule of profit sharing as a sufficient basis of liability to third
persons. It is agreed that the beneficiaries are not liable to one
contracting with the trustees with knowledge of inhibitions contained in the terms of association as to personal liability.13 Formation of corporation and limited partnership are not then the
only ways in which may be obtained immunity from personal liability by those who would enjoy the earnings of capital they have
invested in business. Why cannot the law charge persons doing
business with an association which holds itself out as a trust with
knowledge of existing limitations on the power of trustees which
are customary and usual in such associations? The law should
as in the case of mining partnerships, recognize the existence of
a new form of association with incidents intended by the parties
which are not contrary to public policy and can be legally effective
12 239 S. W. 1001 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
3 McCarthy v. Parker, 138 N. E. 8 (Mass.
1923) ; Hardie v. Adams Oil Co., 254
:. W. 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; see also Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167 (1907).
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as to third persons who have notice of the character of the association. 5'
To sum up, definitions merely indicate the indicia of partnership, the factors of the situation to be examined and evaluated.
The more important indicia are the presence of a common business,
and the co-ownership of that business in the sense of community
of interest and control. Specific intent of parties to be or not to
be partners is important but not conclusive. Some courts have
appeared to be very keen to uphold a supposed legislative policy
against the assumption of forms and methods of -business of a
corporate character by imposing on unincorporated associates the
unwelcome status of partners.
"' Recent articles on the subject of the Business Trust are Magruder, "The Position
of Shareholders in Business Trusts," 23 CoL. L. Rnv. 423, with bibliography p. 424.
and William W. Cook, "The Mysterious Massachusetts Trust," 9 Aai&. BAR AssN.
JOURNAL 763, December 1923.
Among the leading cases are (1) decisions holding no partnership to exist because
of complete absence of control, Betts v. Hackathorn, 252 S. W. 602 (Ark. 1923)
Williams v. Milton, 215 'ass. 1, 102 N. E. 355; In re Parker 283 Fed. 404 (1921)
Smith v. Anderson, 15 Oh. Div. 247 (1880): (2) decisions holding a partnership
to exist because of full control by beneficiaries, Williams V. Boston, 208 Mass.
497, 94 N. E. 808 (1911) ; Bisbee v. Mackay, 215 Mass. 21, 102 N. E. 327 (1913) ;
Morehead v. Greenville Exchange National Bank, 243 S.W. 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
(3) Decisions holding limited powers, such as election of trustees, amendment and
termination of trust sufficient for partnership, Frost v. Thomuson, 219 Mass. 360.
106 N. E. 1009 (1914) ; Horgan v. Morgan, 233 Mass. 381, 124 N. E. 32 (1919) ;
Neville v. Gifford, 242 Mass. 124, 136 N. E. 160 (1922) ; Wells 0. Mackay Telegraph Co., 239 S. W. 1001, (Tex. Civ. App. 1922, provisions for meetings but
apparently merely to advise trustees on request.)
Contra, R. I. Hospital Trust Co.
v. Copeland, 39 R. I. 193, 98 AUt. 273 (1916) ; Home Lumber Co., v. State Charter
Board, 107 Kans. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1917).
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